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'fb.e Federal. Rese:rve Act beea.me law on December t.:i~ 
1913. on that. date f'orma.l eentra.l l::>anking wa.fl re--insb±t-
u.tad. :tn the u•ted :State:s after an interval o:f 77 years •. 
1'he' purp¢>·se o:f thi& paper ht to esta'bl.i.-sh:st.he 
broad, causal .forees which led to the establisl:llnent of ~he 
Feder.a;.1 Reserve System. 
In order to' .fully understand the :evolution ot· cen-
tral banking 1n the Un1 tad States, it is necessary to GO.n.-
sider the i'unctiontilg of' the banking sys.t.em as seen in ec-
onomic· a..nd f'inaneial .history .. 
Pb.e Fl.rat and. Second .Banke ·of the United S't>a..tat., 
modeled after the Bank of England:, :e.ombine"<i both central 
.and cotJ.Uneroia.1 banking f'a.eilitie:e . ., 'lh.ey pro.v1ded assent-1.al 
a.nd secured a. stable banking :frame-work f'ol? the new- nat1oni> 
lteepeet fD-r eenserva.t.1:v~ ban:ltillg practice wol,"'ked to th.e~r 
success" but a.lso the.ir tatl.ure •. En.deavor1.ng to mainta;1n 
a. atahle curren-cy, thef required note red.empt1t>n in s~c1e 
or ~awtul money" Poli. tical. oppos1,t1on incu.rred bythis prac-
tice led to. its dem:tae :in 1.836. 
I ha.vce 11ev1ewe-d tha rise of .F;ree: Banking,. the cor-
respondent relat.1onsh1p,. and the Independent ~easury Sys-, 
tem .. "', Amer:iea.n banking ·exp.arl:enee a..tte.r 1836. a.;f'forda m.any 
11J.:ustrat1ons o;f' the need :for central banklng., and. eonapio-




I have> eQnside'red. the tu.rn:ing po.ints 1.n banking 
and legislation i.n t.hia light..;J' shGwing the ~ed t'or a. c.en-
tl'a.l. orga.n1za.tion~ and how t~ most critiaa.l JUeed& we~ 
1mprovise.,d...., 
The Currency of the :.ca. t.io:o. &.ft.er 1836 consi.st.ed 
·'-":-·-: . -: .~ .. 
·Of the notes Of" about 2800 :state bankaf> WhoSe motiVe Of 
iaau.e wa.a purely proti:t.--aeeking and entirely l.tQ.regUlated ... 
Many or these i.ssues were wortbl'ti&$). others va.r.iad 1n val.ua 
up to par,.,. 'l'h1a eondition could not be tolera"{l.... ~ 
p::t'im.e need became the eata.bllSbm:ent: of .a .sate and unrtorm 
eurr-eney. The needs of the ca. vil. War prodded tbe Govern-
m-ent to act and th~ Na.ti.Ocnal Banking Act wa..s pa:saed 1n 
1863.. A. mea.s~e of een'tral1zat~io:n a.nd :t"egulation was t.tru:s 
a:ff'ected. by the Fette:roalt Government~ 
Und:e.r the liatwnaJ. .Banking 8.y.at.em a bond~e0\1.!"'$d 
curreney and. a s.yste.m or oblig~t.o.ry indl.Vi.dlltitl. l'e&.erves 
were re-lied upon to aerve the banking I:!;Se.d,.s o:f th:e coun-
t.;r-y.., TJ:le· nsed for at.a.bili.ty had been me-t,. bU't the -eeon®ly 
.gradual~y outgr.ew the banking sJl!!teat.. It eoUl.d n-c;,t. aup-
port the areat e.xpa.na1on of' the late nineteenth e.entury.~ 
EXtremes o:r pa;nie and. pros peri "ty :eultainated. 1.n th@ p&.l:l.l.:<~ o:f' 
1907 .. , 
Thi'~ gaa.t and g~eral bank:ing f&U\U"es had 
gMiidually ari!i-en •. 
The i"il'fst need wa.a ttelast.ie1. tyu i' o:r & .fl.ex.i:b~$ 
. 





The second,. and mo·N fundamental requ.1I"~t."""li:as 
a ·.system to :~Vi4$ ban:~ reaenes t.Q. meat thee oon't.i.J.rual. 
.and s.ometiRI:$1!1 extra.ol"dine.ry demand f'o-r- eredit.. The tt-u:e 
·m.e,s.ning and :f"uncti.on o:f bank reserV$ was·iittle UnElerstood 
by the public~. attd ·flH':elil ~:rs a.t that' .t.~'-· 
Th~ tb.ird :raq'U1.l"ement~ ::r.~ng o!~e in the UxU.ted 
Sta.t-.ea;g waa the nreia.t1on o:f' a ma;~ e'!-ftir conlJJJ:ereial. paper" .. 
l.'ht;s served. lt~; Europe t.o maJta thEi bulk of' bank. asset$~ 11.•1t1 
~~"':;< ' 
and D1:Q.b1le over t.he wbole con.tillent... !his. s~ ba:nk:1ng 
practice had: neYe:r been po.s.a:tble in the Dni ted. St~tes: .. 
Ret'or.m e:mbreu}.ad chi4d'ly tha'se tJ:.wee meastn-e..a .. 
Ho-w this need a.ro:ae."" and how the .Federal ReB.arve aye tam. mat 
this need is the theme of th!hs paper ... 
I J:JB;.ve.- ~sented as mu:eh rel.at.iv-e raa.te-rlal as 
seemed des.trabl~ to a.J1i the O:Ol!ltl\"a&t or· the workine o:f the 
'batl:king sys,t~lfl be:fs~tt1 and.' a..ftar the Federal R$aer-ve Act., 
!his contrast il'luetr~tas the aohi~V"a.tlt$m at th~ orgl:!J.).iC 






t~:Ba.nking .i:e not independent o:f' the economy i.t 
l . . . 
serves.n In the Un1.t$d Btate.s,~ :it:a deFV.el.opment ha.s not 
been a. ateady evolution ~ .s;rowth1, but it haa been led to 
ex.ceas in periods of great. expa.n&i-on"' a.nd it baa l·ed the 
country into b1.tter dep:r-eas1on., The nature of' our gJ:>owth 
made it impossible :for hanks to comfine themselves to the 
merua.ntil~ ba~ing t:rad.l tio:ns -of ii"U.rope .. , · our needs were not 
eomm..er·oial. as 1n the m.at'l:ll"e eco:llOil.ies o·f Western Europe, but-
1n.du$trial and agl"'1cul.t:ura.l.. And ·enntrary to the orderly 
evolut~oi .of c.ont1nental banking pra..etice" Atn.~:t"ican banking 
; .. 
is :r-emarkable: :for the number a.nd. ~:iety of :foras developed~ 
The f:iret experiments in Ge;Jntral·; banking were ended 
when .President Jackson vetoed the ebarter of the ·Second Bank 
,o.;f the Up;tted ·States; tb.e cotlntry was deet;t:ned tp pay a 
ha.a.vy penalty fol:' t~ -la.ck o.f' central banking ;f$;cil1.ties in 
the next 15 ye~rs,~ In th.a.t interval:~. ~he ne:cessary .tunetto.ns 
of a central· bank were .fUl:flliad by various other agen~.ee:; 
ol. ty cmr.respondent arrangeu:aent.-s, c.l.eal":tng ho:uaea,., s.rui 1th-e 
.lndependent Treasury :Sy.st:em among then~ 
n The Firat and Second. .Ba.uks: of the United 
State:s had provided f'l.scell agency and d.epos:ito:I"y 
S$l:Vice:a, and SOUght t.o ~S:t.r&1n OV'~:t"'-$X'I;ell.:Sl,Oil 
of ·credit ~y $tate, ba.n.ks and to reJSUl.ate: no~ .is--
sue,, by 1ns:i.$tfug upon note rad:empt.1.ona, ... 1lt 2 
Fed~rAl Reael:'tts 'Sys-tem, _·HBa.n.J!:1ng Stud1-eatt 194-1. Page 36 
Taus, E: .. R,..,. tteentra.l :&m.king Functions of the U ... s., Tre.aau:t;"J' 
1789-.,l94lu Co:lubla -university Press; 1943 .P.1.7 
• 
2 
C:orraspondant banking arrangement.s were utilized to 
hold :reserves,, and they -.are py:ra.:nided b-oot s:na.ll bank t.o 
l.arg;e bank,.. iJhe:r-a was no· ability to expand reserve$ when 
meet needed~ The clf:laring hous~ was dev1s.ed_ to expand res.,... 
erve.s in l86ot a.oo used subs.eH};U:ently, but l.ts activ1.ty was 
loeali~ed... However,, "the cleari:ng system la;ter bec&me the 
Pa:S.is :for the i:o;terregl.·qna.l. c.lea.rins ~f' currency and ehecks 
o:f tlle F~de:ral. Reserve $ys.tam"'' 
Up to· 2838 a bank charter w:a.s procurable only by .a. 
· ·svecia.l. l.eg1alat1ve ac.t~ T.hi:a advantage to existing ba.nka 
wa.~:~":abol.ished. when ~w York State passed ,the n,Free Ba.ll.ki!.lg 
Act". e.uthor1~ins; anyone to. procure & e~ter and engage in 
banking by meet~ c~rt&in ~inlmUm requirements~ ~ee Bank-
ing :apread to. other a.tatea and 1n the West degenerated into. 
llwt(ldc&t banking:o:., wb.i·eb.,. s:1gn1..ticantl.y,. ;followed upon the: 
deat1sa of the Second Bank o.f' t-he UnitedStates ... 
Tbis Pet'iod alao aa.w th~ tit-flit lsgi'slative r.equi:r>e·-
Eaent$ a.s to bank :NI'Ser't.ets '!'- 1he-y app1i·ed to ci,t>e:ul.a tins n<>:tea 
for at tbla time: tb& ex.tenaion of credit di.reot.ly increase-d 
the not.es 1n circulation~ and l'l.at~ aa now;,r deposits... New York 
at-ate at :fil"at requir,ed r:ea·ervas •o.f' l2i~ against notes .• · Lou""' 
-
1si.an,a, law required cash a.&aste: &'<}.:ual.1ing. one t.bird of com"'" 
' . 
bl.ned note and depo1U.t l.ia.b.i.litl$$.,_ &nd l:iqu:td. as:set.s squal 
to th~ other tw() th:i.l:'d!h In the panic of J.831 ,. th& banks of 
New Orleans. did not suspend.. l'.h.e problem or- op'tilaUDt · reaerve 
.1 requ.irem~nts w.a.s just beginning~ 
J:.,. Willis:;.· R..,.P.~., *kfhe 'lbeory and ?.ract..1c.e o.f' Central Bar:lltingtt 
· Harper and BroJ!L, 1936 P~ 274 
1he 1'1:rs.t reserves compr~~ed specie in the oankta 
own vaults;, later j:t grew tc~: include deposits 1n lar-ger 
be.nks..., Here wa.a. the beginning of' the correspondent ralat,-
1onsh1p.,. In 1.855, the volume- o1: daposl.t liabilities attain--
ed a volume greater trJS.n that o:r note lia'bil1tie,a~ The 
provisi.on of bank credit in the f:o..r·m o:f dep-osits subjeet 
to eb.eck: instea.;d of e1reulatillg note-a; beeam:e the principal-
1 
funet1,on of' banks,., 
Aft'S!' the dissol.ut.ion o:f' 'the S,acond Bank oi' 1836.., 
the public tunds had t.o:oe kept in state- banks which came. 
to be known as 'ttpe;t~ btulka.,. In the l,ong depreaa:1on of 1837:;c 
many ·of' th-ese banks ta:lled ca:ust.ng much .loes ~nd inconvan-
i9'ne$ to the Treaa:u~y,.., To solve this pro:bJ.~:m and avi.od the 
uee of state banks wh.1ch were now popul.arly d:i:a.tru:sted, "tM. 
Independent 1're:aaury 5yate!ll we.:a establ.ia:hed by th-e Acta af" 
184o .and 1846.., 
The need was :tor an e.tencJ' to k-eep go-.ermment·funda 
aa:ra anA the Independent Trea.s~r,- system: became this a.e;enoJ" ... 
It assumed broad eent:r-a.l banking ;tUnct.i.ons ,, whether popul,-.. 
.a.rly or legally ~eo:gni%ied or not~ T.he system W!!B an attempt. 
t_ G attain minimum central banking a~r'Vicem,, and a. eom-orom..1sa 
. - " . 
derv:.1ea •• P.aenry Clay had reeoglli:zed the need for a eent.ral 
bank:r but f.ln'" po11. t!.ea1. party f'sl t $trong -enough t.o v.iol.at.& · 
1 the prejudices eata.blished during the Ja.cksonian. strugg~a ... " 
l... N&t1ona.l M.ooetar:y Gomm1:aa.ion publ:ica.tiem, Ds<v.1a~ A*'!t~. 
nThe Qrlgin o:.f' the J!Ca.tional. Bal!Uting Sy-atetatt Poc,.,582 
2-"" Ts.t.u~:J: neentrs.l Banking~,.,·.~~·. P., 49 . 
3... Wi.l.lle, nfue ib.eory and Pr,act:tee of Central Bankins.w I'. 62 
... 
• 
~1 .from the banking ·syste-m,. 
ttThi.s worked :fairly well.aa long as the e;ov.ari:J.ment 
-could .maintain itsel:r on a speeiii basi:EJ... But the; ::~~: _ 
tremendous burden o:f the Cl.Y.il Ji~r foraed tbe 
Treasury to return to a cr:ed.it basis and pat1."on.i%e 
the b&nka once more,~ ~1 . .· · 
Untll 1921 when the Syetam was abol.isl:led:;: the :trea.auryf:S l?$""' 
l$.t1ons with the banking systa_m :constantly 1:ne.reaaed.. By 
its very na. ture 1 t was a m.~jor infi..ttanee 1.n .financ~a.l. af'1"&irs, 
drawing :fres.t am.ount.s from. the ba.nking s,j'stem: at. one t.:im;e., 
; tr...en restoring them.,. Its 1nfl.uence has -continued to this 
day. 
11 l'he.se dlsturbancas -caused by Tl:'saetury opera t1ons. were 
one upset o:f' tbe g&neral probletn;. another was. in-
volved in the use o!" Trea:su:J:>:y :funds to eo:r:reet eon-. 
d1t1ona not CaNsed by tr~aaur;r -op.erat1ons, ... l·t2 
'flU.~. -"aimply, wa.e .central ba.:oltlng aet11J1ty;e:· 
The policy :t'ol.low:ed toward the banks and the mon:ey mar-, 
k,et. var-ied wi tb the v1awa of' the Bac:reta.ties regarding the 
scope of o.f t.he aut.horl.ty of th~ of.tiea.-. Very often., ~eag,.,., 
ury i.nt.erpoa1tioon took the :t"orm ot deposit oi' tunda ln banks.'"" 
or wl.thdra.wals of fUoda .from banks~. thereby af':t':eeting a non.-
tra.etion of reaarv&"S and credit~ Seerata.r:y Cobb,. in l857., 
1 .. 
»t.o supply additional. reearv.et :f'Unda to the. banks 
and :rel.l.evEl!' th~ crisis that l:'JB.d devs:toped;, mad$ 
pttrcha.aes of' g.ov-er:tll'.n-ent bonde in the open marltet 1 
pay1:ng out .funds for tbe~ whieh f'ound ioo.ir way dire-ct~y into bank rea~rvee,., 1"3 
'Ihom&fh R..,G ... , t~·ou.r .Modarn Banking and .Moneta-ry Sy.st,emtt 
· Pl."'flnt-ic,e..-&11 1942 P. 246 · 




l&e:re the. Tre9.aury wa.s exerc.ialng au 1ndiapu.tabla 
central. banldng :runc.'tj:.on... 
~ c~~qluda; In tltl.& .a.blilence of Tor:nal eentral barl.lt-· 
1ng a.f'tex- 1836, s. lead!.ng :r"Ol9 had l:l$att a.asum~d by the !n,.,.. 
dependent Traa.su~;r Syst.e.lii"'' It ·-·•t f1rat provided. <n:Uy· the 
m1numum adm1niatr-at1'Va eerv1ces1 but it- was central bs:nk--
ing~ whether re-eogn1zed or not.... Central bank1%lg w-am also 
improvised 'by correa_pondent rela.t1ons'*' a.a a means ot ho:J.d..., 
.1ng reserve deposits,,- and by the elear!.ng bouae_, wbioh :s~rv.­
ed to -e-nla.-:rge -l!Wil&e.rv$ .funds 1n a er1s.1s,.. 
.A t:u.'r'thur v1t-a.l step t.owa.rd :c-ent;rali:Zii.tion was ye-t 
'to be tak-en.-. The economy w;a.e :f:!tru@ing w1 th a -ebaoa. of" 
note .1-s:sue. 'by 1500 ata:ta be.tl:ks.. .Prer-aquiaita i;o- -&n;y broad 
organiz&t-iOJ;l 0:8, btluJ.ki:ag,. there mll::St be national. eurreney 
uni:form-1 ty ~ Achievine? this :f"i;t?st- re:f'o·rm wi. tb the pa.Qage 
of' the- National &ulki~ Aet,~ ihE!Ii f-ederal Gov.\i~ent aga.i.n 





II THE NATIONAL BANJUNG S!TT.Eilt 
T.b.a wideapre&d adoption of rra,e ~. banking legi:ala tion 
! i 
. i· 
a.fter 1838 stimulated a rapid growth o:d banks, accompan.l.ed 
; i 
. \ 
by an 1neraa.ae in tb.e nullber and 1rar1~ty of note issues.. In 
:- ; 
' ' 
spite of le-gisla.tiV$ m:easu.rea by ;nany is-hates to aa.f'eguaf>d 
: l 
aga1net endle.se al;ru.se6. 7 the cond.i tion bf tbe Cu:t'rsney 'through-
~ 
out the country sradual.~y became obac"ti~,., '!he altu.ation 
I ~ 
called for national m·sasures·*' Finally, the advent or the 
i ~ 
CiVil War CO.llpelled the tJ::r-ea.~ury to turn to the l:;le.nk:s :tor 
aid ln financlog the emergency· .• The exigencies o:r war :finance 
proved too great,. ·&nd a.s the l'reasury x-el.ations witb hutldreds 
o:r individual banka became 2.0re and l¥l9l"e impossible, the 
Nati.onal Banki.ng Act wa.a pa·esed. in 1863 and revised. in 1864~~ 
T'he esta.'bl.1shment a-t the National Banking Syete!ll. was 11open 
a.cknowTedg!Uent of' tl!E!l insufficiency of the 
Independent ~aaury System tor :fi.aca.l. pnrpo'Ses in t1.m.-es o:f 
1 
emergency;t 1~ and it ended a pe-riod of' atonetaey chaos which, 
in ;retroapeet, appears a.lmoat intolerable,. 
'!he bs.aie aims of Secretary Chase ot tl:'~ Treasury., 
leading proponent o:f the general banking measure" were the 
oraat1on of' a -saf:e and u..nl.f'orar curr·ency~ and tr..e esta.bl1slame.at 
o.:f' & bank.lne; ey:etem more bene.ficent fo;r all~ lncludi.O.S. U;..e 
'!reasury . Here:;. the Feder.a.l.. Go vernare nt .a. t la.-£ t aaau111ed banking 




a.uthoi>ity,.. In 1866,. a !;)t>-obib.1tive tax was placed on state 
b:a,nk notes, and previously reluctant state bank-s conve-rted 
al.moet in a. body to National charter-a .. 
The new natlonal bank no tea w.ere backed by govern_,. 
ment boniis ha:v.ing tb.e' ileir.cula.tion privilege.,.. H T.bi:s device 
also· helped obtain .needed money .f.or th:e wa.r effort, by 
providing a ready m.arket f'o:r bonds .. one tenth of tbe wad:' 
debt was :s.old to tr..& Nat1ona.l Eankl.ng Sy.etem 1n t.his way .• 
But mo-at important,. the :first ,e,t.ep towa.t"d banking central'-
1~atio:a was taken1 the -creation of a ·single:,. unlfo:rill,, 
t:urrency throughout. the nation.,. replac.lne the note 1esues 
of 1:5oo different state mu:lk:s .• 
!he Act allowed the ba.nka to engage ln wide baDJr-
l.ng. operations;. note hHme, receipt and transfer or deposits,. 
loans and inveetma:o:ts, .and foreign ex.change relations~ Each 
National Bank was requil::.ed. to· atccept the note-s at others at 
pa.r.J. and to arranse .for redemption of its notes ln lawfUl 
money in seventeen large citie.s ~ Reserve x-aquiremen.te were 
de~ignated :f'or three a.izes o:r banks. 
L".tust impot'tant, ln retrospect.,. was the provision .:fol!" 
oond·-s.eeured curren.ey,~ Each. ba;n.k;. oorore opening wa..s to 
depo.e it with the 'l'!'easury, Gov.ern;nent bond. e.,. amounting to 
not l~e:e than one tbii'd of its paid-in cap,1 tal .stock.. ln 
return., 1 t. could i:sEus notes up to 9o (ls.te.r loo}t} O·f tb.e 




or !'or govern.;nent bonds either, which were firmly he:td by 
the National Banks~ So in practice, the acheille ot res-erve 
require::nents funneled reserve fUnds .!"rom bank to bank into 
the central re-serve c.lt1es and into the ~ York Stock 
Exchange in sreat. a..atout'lts., 'lba eonaequent d.eund. :tor 
ae cur.S. ti6e and :funds g:rsw and ;nu ch of" the nation' a credit 
was inv-a.ated ln securitittH!,, which by their very nature 1 
were illiquid. So~ the x·eserves of' all were drawn :it)own to 
a. lllnimum when exce.£3s f'u.nds ,coUld be employed prof1 tabl.y in 
tbe securiti~a markets in good times .. This was tl:e natural 
reeul t of competl t.1on a.<nong t'h$ thousands ot indi v idusl 
bankir...g. unit&, eee:k..Lne. to wtil.tze their .funds ;J;tost pro:t'ita:bly- ... 
tt.But when heavy dema.lld.a f'or e,old :from abroad)! 
or ex.eeasive dollesM.c demand.e Xor c1rcula"t1~n., 
or an abnormal inc~ase of bank loane and bank 
deposita he.~ brought .exoeaa raeerve.e down to 
or below the'legal requirements; f'inancial 
cond1 tiorl$ became a. t once cri t.1 cal. •2 
Without a central. organization~ w:t.ich could f'ur.a.ish add--
itional ;r"eserv,es,,. {this is tl:l$ very .beart ot the ma.t'tar):. 
in the :form of' cur:r-~ncy or deposits, t.ta. heavy rise i.a 
depoaits ar a marked. increase in t.he volume c:f' circulation 
3 
ware bound e.lif.to.mati.cally to tie up the batllta .• " 
lo illustrate;. in a. bull :na.rket, .reeerv~ ratios 
tended toward their legal :ninimum."' and a seasonal flow of: 
1 
1 ... National tolo.llE?ta.ry Com:uiesion publication .. 
Davis, Andrew H .• "'~ Or1.g1ri of' the National Ba.nking Syste.m.t1 
2 ... Jla.tional i'!cm.etary Co~ltl:iseion publlea.tion 
uTb.e D1ecount System in h.uropan as publiehed in 
Wa.rburg,, *1Tne Federal B:~ae.rva f:y:e.tem Volume II. 
Maci:;iillan~ 193o·, P'" 189 . 
3 " Ibid~ P~- lS7 . . 
• 
.~ 
cash fro:n New York to the country b&nkE &5 ln the :tall put 
e,reat preseure upon New York to liquidate loans-: 11 In 1872, 
the loane of seven l.arse iiiew York 'b&nks were $80 millions 
in July, and $61 :n1ll1one in November, after the autum 
l 
withdrawals by country banks.,.,. if Th.e sequence was aa follows ... 
The loans to be reduced were mainly call loans o:r speculato.rs ... 
Tq pay, tl:leJ. t..tad to bo:rrow elsewhere, easy enough wh.en the 
markets were normal,.__... they must liquide.:te ~ I.nt.lmea o:r 
excea.eive speculation and gen$ral ex.p:an-aion Alii) in 1872,, 
this was just enough to .a~t. o:ff' the downturn.. Fear of the 
:future valua.e grew and aprea.d~ prlcee .rell:r. general refusal 
bo buy induced acute panic 1n securities prices, and this 
apread. general contraction and in 1.873 1 a long depression 
resulted . ., The pa..ttern o:£' panic in 1.893 .and in 1907 was 
similar given varying cirewnsta.nces and refinements ... 
Funda.m:snta.lly, the .syatem 1teel.f' was the f:iret. 
c.auee of' :failure, beeominE. p:t"ogressl vely less abla to meet 
the needs oi' the trem.endous economic growth following th& 
Civil War .. 
To return to the pattarn of failure, t:t.1:a was the 
banks' position in cr~.s.is .. With reserve ratios at their 
:niniauJI, and aecurltlee loans uncoll.ectabl·e, t't.e banks had 
to choose between sending :funds. to tl"J.Sir correspondents as 
obligated" and allowing re.ser"vee to :fall below tbe required 
:.n.in1m:um, or ds.f'aul.t. and maintain their own pas1t.1on~. In 
1.873, the banks :Collowed the .:first course, whlct. was more 




desirable f'or the general :)ubllc,. ln later timem~ lE93 and 
1907 t the ba.nk.s eoueht to p.r·eaerve their own poe!tlon. 
3anke.rs pani·c and general auspens.ion of paym-ents :followed; 
banks struggled to :r$duce laamt and 1Jiprove their reserve 
poe1 tions. City banks es.r-ry1.og 'b$..nkera. 1 balance$ had to 
cboose between t::ont.ractio:o of' loa.na 1 sub-legal reserves'" o:r 
.suspensl.on of ca·11h !)ay~tUnlts. In 1893 and 1907, thsy ehose 
to suspend and. ma1nte.in the1r :reserva:!\1~ t1W1th no central 
banking 1nst1tut1o·n to provide relief' 1 nobody could 
strengthen hie position .save by attacking his n.ele;hbor.~ 
11In t1JlaJ! o:t' aeriou-a danger-,. tbe be.n.k..e of 
tbe country were Torced to re2y chiefly 
upon their own euh reserve;S, :which, as a 
eo nee qu.en.ce, had to be maintained at a. 
high level-=Mgh4itl? than in lloat advanced 
countrie:S. lhis situation gave the vault 
reserve in American com.nercial. banks an 
importance n~t :found 1n the co~mercial 
banks of E.'urope~. European joint-stock 
1 
banks normally carried little ea$b in 
their vaults$ tbay plaeed their reliance 
for emergency funds directly ol." indirectly 
upon the central baziks ""tt2 
In the general prosperity and prlce inflation ot: 
the l900 1 s, the. b&nke ae,.-ain 'became :fully ttloa.ned-up~, 
and reeervea gradually .settled. to the minliZl~m.... The usual 
seasonal demand :for credit in the Au tuottn induced 'ttb.e J.ae t. 
ot the .?an1c~h nThe tact ls tbat the panic of l907-oS and 
the attendant dl.f'ficul tlea ;narked. the final collapse o:t 
.3 
tbe whole syetem .. w 
l-.. J. L. •. Laughlin, Ji;Banking Proe,reaa't Scribner's, ~. Y~) 1920 ?. 41 
2:~ Willis,. nlheory and Practice ot Central B&.nkingr' E., 73 
3.., :~.1111e, '~'~'lh&ory and .Practice ot Centua.l Bankingrt 
Harper's; New York1.9:36,.. ?. 73 
• 
1'he ;>roble:n or b&nltin,g re:torm began in earnest 
a.fter the panic of 1893 a.nd ~ontlnued ror two decades.., ·rhe 
an im1 tat ion or the joint suaran.t:ee note 1seue eye tam of 
Canada~ Hare, a joint guaranty ror note iseue would force 
t.be greatest respons1bil.ity and r.1a.k upo.a. the largest banka.-. 
'lhe object,. ela.atic1ty; was des.1rab~e and n.eces.aaryj the 
method aoon encounte~d only hostility and woree~ 1ndit-
£erenca .• More progreae toward publiclzi.ng and developing 
the banking :refor-lll was needed before understanding a.nd 
popular concern coul.d be aroused. •. 
The Preaidentla.l ca.!llpa1£n o-r J.896 wa.a :roue,ht s..ctd 
won by the r~publican :Pa.rt_y o.a the standard qu-estion.., A 
pJ.at:rorat. pledg:e was ftsupport o:t .currency re!ormn and many 
ware led to expect e:fforta toward a careful .rev1e.1.on o:t 
nA v.ictori.oua party, however 6 regards con-
troverted issue in .a light quite dif'fereo.t 
from that which has be0n thrown upon ~hem 
durin£ their earlier etages .. With the 
Republican Party in of':flce in the Sprlns 
or 1897t very deeidsd. reluctance to a.uthor-
ize positive &et.lon waa exbibl.tee.,fll 
A .group o:r CoJtn-e.rc1.al orga.ni~t.1on.i! sponsored 1n 
J..897, the I:ndi&Mpoli.s Curreney Co.avantionw 1a io~Qnetary 
Com.m1.ss1on appointed by this body sent a report to 
Congress,., nTh1s report. .:aay be reeard.ed as su;n.;nar1-z1ng and 
• 
• 
and reflectlog tt.e then gene.ral. position or Cl.lr-rent bankins. 
~ 
anG economic thought on th~ aubjeet or reforta leg:1&1a.tioa ... rt 
The essential ideas were two~ 
A~ ?rovie1on :for ltJ:sue or a. ba.nk note currency 
based upon com:nercial ae:aet.s and t.here.:rore 111 a.ccol:"dance 
with the needs or commerce~ 
B. Term.ina.t1on o! tl'.te Ind-ependent Treasury eye tew. 
1n. som-e of its objectio:o.able &&peeto~h 
These recom.mendat.ion:a were presented 1n bill .form 
to Cong.r·eae, 
"but such action wu f'ar :rrom th$ intention o:f 
Congress.., It was at t:he.t t.l..me al.m-ost a cardi-
nal principal. o£ pol1 tic a wi tb the leade.r·s o:f 
the Re-publican Pa.rtr to d.o as little &a poaei,.... 
ble w1 th tr..e currency &nd banking quee tion. tt2 
The Ba:ok.ing and currency Com.:nitt,ee Qf the 
House of Reprasenta ti vee was Tilled· troat l900 to 1908 
with thle consi.derat1on in mind .. 
'fu.$ Span.ish-Amer 1 can War :followsd upon th8 report 
of the India.na.polis Currency Commissions and diverted the 
attention o.f' the public :from technioal. i:IU1!U& and no 
further progresa waa .:aa.de until 1900* W1.th another 
P:remidentia.l election a.ppxooaching, and recallipg the 
recomm:al:lda.tiona or J.897 ~ tba Cong.rErss passed the so-es.J.lad. 
Gold Standard Act of 1.900.. The chief' proviaiona were t:h;r.'ee;. 
l,. H. P ~ Willis, "Tba F. R .. .S. 11 ?~ ll 
2 .. Ib1d4' P,. 12 
• 
• 
A. Provision :tor a redemption tund. of' i150 millions 
fer graanbaek~L., 
a .... ?rovieion to 'lower tbe ro-iniJnln capital1.za't1on 
or Na.tional Banke. to ~25"'000;;: &lld tb.ereh~· answer p:reesing 
ba.nk.ing and cur-rency need:er. ., 
.C. :2rovie1on t.o re:tund part. o:r the outstanding 
Government bon.d..s into 2% eansola)' 1 fblch would .be una.t~ 
tractive to other tl'..a.n. banks wt1o would support currency 
cireu.lati.on with them,. '!his na:~ iseue was .apeclfice.lly pa.y-
l. 
a.bJ.-e in gold and the Act received ita .na.me :t'ro.a:t this,. 
After ~900, small be.ake ~D;U.l.t1plied ra?ldly and th$ 
great bulk o.f national bon.de. war~ so.o.a. absorbed by the banka,. 
thus achieving the &il!.J.s oi' tbe Aet of 19001' by providing 
Jtore cm.\renay" but also d:ravia.g tba 11111 ted ela.stici ty more 
taut than ever~ In the ,early l900f a g~nera.l proeperl.ty~ 
coupled with inflationary tendencies prevailed,.. The stLtJ.U::ta...-
t.1on of business drew heavily on the .t'eeervca of· the banke ... 
Seaeon.al deiil.andE becam.e more pronounced.lf alterm1.tint. with 
periods oi' ra1.axat1on when a.:n abuooanca o! ban.kere balances 
in hew York found their way to the stock .n.ar.k.et" f'urtt ... er 
stiJ.tul.a ting inf'la. tionary trends. 
r1'1he Sec:r•etary of tba trea.eury dUring t:he 
:first six or seven yeare of the ne?! century 
ware busied. wit.h way.e arui ;;ne.a.ns of rendex•...-. 
lng tbe inelastic bank currency slie:ttly 
more a'V&il.abla, and they interpreted the 
National Banking Act to a.lA>ow th&m to mlti-
ga te its chief· hardships ~:2 . 
:L. :National M-onetary Co:i.mi.Se ion.~ Sprague, 0. ~~. C~ 
. '· 
n Crises Under the .t~ational. .Ban~ing Syet.emn 1910, P.. 60 
2,.. WillisJ alhe F. R. 6 .• ~ 
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cally iE_nored by the Congreas... Only in the House Banking 
an-d CUrranc]' Co:auittee was the qu•2tio.o. ~ept alive.., and 
cb1&fly because the cl:air;nan> Cl"li!U:'"l$2 it. F'ovler~ was a 
student of tt.te subJect,. He labored in "'ain. to secure at-
tention tor his ;-neasli%'6$ f'or tttEJ- deca4e of 1900 to 1910., 
fli.l!) cbie.f aueeeas was to attract tl:.e interest of the ao&-
de;u1c eo:n:nuni ty; who aided in brine, ins undera tanding or a 
technical proble:n to .nany ~-
However, events the~~elvea were to force the 
matter'"' Sf.$ady i.nf'latl.on at;:,gravated. by a gradual recurrence 
o:t bad ba.nking_J :much on the ,part o;f' newly O!'g$.n1z.ed. banks,: 
i~pelled the banking and credit syeteil to become :fully 
Treasury wae not in a position to help by depoeiting 
Government funds Q...S it bad ;ua.ny tim:aa in tr~e past .. , lhe 
st.orlll buJ:>at in 'th& t'a.lJ. of 1907 ·,;itt. tr ..e ~tulm demand ror 
dredlt .. Here, a mere aeas.ona.l expane1on" to oo expected by 
everyone .I' was tbe turning point and ~re.c1p1 t.ated a ssneral 
l. 
colla pee ,, 
It had beOOI!fle evident that monetary -and b&.Pict:S;ng 
reform: was no,t merely a q_uemtion or correcting the 1ll$-
laatic1ty oi' the currency,. 1iJ:<Le Panic taught that re.rorm 




- incorporated lnto 1t tor a year,. until the new s:;stell c-ould 
be organized-.., The b&nke in l.914 organized 45 national 
This Act ot l90e, later known as the Aldrich-Vreeland 
Act~ aleo, created a National :.-ton&tary Com:niesion.. '!hie body 
wu compo~ed of nlne <tla>1!.•r& or the Sana te and nlne :aembera 
o-t the Houee o:t Representatives~ An extensive i.nveetigatl.on 
or banltine_ history and practice was undertaken by ..napy 
experts enga{!cd by the Co'llflliseion .. All phases o'f baaking 
were covered and . .a. large library was co:n;>1led. 'J.'he w.n.u1aeion 
prepared a refor~ ~eaa~re which beca~ knowa as the 
Aldrich Bill, after the Chairman and noted Senator .from 
2 
Rhode Island... 'l'he bill providEd for tr~ f-orifl&tion or a 
11 Nat1onal Re~erve Aesociation" to be cs.p1tal1zed at 
ilOo,ooo,ooo. It wae to co.~tprice ti!'teen branches with a 
head office in ·~.;ashine_:.to-n, n~ c ... and was to be owned by the: 
me;nber banks'* Senator .r.:tdrich r..ad aat:u:lled leadership in the 
bB.nkln£ retor~ movement,. and e::ave 1 t great impetus,. The 
q_ue£tion beca:ne a source of muct political controversy> 
thl~ bill "'rne.y be regardect a.e tr.e Republican vere1on or tl'l& 
3 
neutral ::nodal~ tt 
'Jlle t'unda.·l!tmtal r.equlre:nent.e of banking re!'orm were 
widely discuaE:ed- a."l.d etudied after tt.e deba.cle or 1907 ~ 'lh&· 
l,. Laugt:lin, t''lhe Federal. fi¥erve Act·: .. ·.·• 11 
2,:; .N .. .:·t. G •. Rapoxot,_ 11 Suggested Plan f'or Monetary Legislation" 
4ubmitted Jan~ 16, 1911, Senate document 784 
3 ... W's.rburg, ~'The F* R .. 5.-J...-. ... '"' 11 " Volume II P. 10 
• 
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leading authorities found. sene:ral a.gree:nent uponthres 
1 
leadi!l€ phase a of' reform~ They ve:r-e : 
{E) The provi~lon of a flexible eupply or currency 
and credit to cor:t'ee?Ond. t.o tt.e need.e of c.oaneree ~ 
( 11) 'lbs· creation o:f a. diA;:tcount um.rket for co:n-
:11e:rcial paper;. 
(III) The provision of a ~chanis~ to make avail-
able bank reserves wt.e-n requ1red 1 a.nd thereby forestall 
panlc and prom.ote -stab11.1ty ... 
The iarport.ance of the ~aat !lAa £):."own steadily since 
1913~ Presently the function, of reserves is by f'&r the :noat 
1mpo;rtant considera.tlon ln eentral banking theory .. 
Next 1 will con$ider the tra~ework wltcin which 
thes'EJ principJUse o~ ret'or;n were to be established, the 
proviaione of the Federal I-uaaerva Act.., 
1 . Willis, . tt The i•"ederal Reserve Sys t-e:n ~'~ 
Laughlin~" "lb.e Feder.s.l BeaervtJ Sy$te:.an and rrBanking P:t>ogi"'eas~t 
Report of the J". .d. G ~, Warburg.;; "'The Fe-dere.l. Reserve Sya te~ tt 




The que.et.1on of a central bank became an 1saue in 
?residential election of 1912: in which the Democratic Pe.rty 
waa victorious. The long-awaited establ1sh~ent of central-
banking wae: finally a .. chieved ln ~91.3 under tt.a adm1ni.s-· 
tratlon and encouragement of' .President Wileon. '!'he 
Fede.r•al nee.erye Act became l&w Dece:nber 23 1 1913,. 
!be long title o:r the Act .is stated aaj. 
"t..n Act to provide ror the e·eta\l1shulent 
o:f"Feder&l Reaerve :Be.nke., to :furnish an 
ela.aticic currency 11 to afford ~neans of 
:t>adiscouati:ag co:n.!erqial ;>aper, to es-
tablieh a ;nore effective auperv1slon or 
b&nkins in the United ZtatesJ and for 
other ;mrpone.a ... ~1 
'It.e eyete:n. 1;1ae not to replace any part of thE!J 
kt1one.l Banking Syst.e'n;. 1 t was superi:nposed upon 1 t .. 
tt The Am€-rlca.n ayste;n. or lla.ny thou_es.nde of independent banks 
2 
was continued~ n The st.ructure created by tbe Act consisted 
o.f twelve F'&d€r&l Rese-rve districts$ a b&nk to be eE-
tabl1$had in each,: t.o be· g,over~d by tl;..tenFedera.l Reserve 
Boardn, with the advice of the ttFedera.l Advisory Council..~'~ 
Following, I wl11 -sun\.~ize the text of' ttje ..a.et. 
It be£1nc by !)rov1d.1ng for tl'le di v1s1on of tb& 
country into Reserve dietricta~ followine the tendencies o~ 
co:u!llerca, and not neceEHta.rily a tate linea. 
l. ~ Act o.£ Daca:nber 23;) 191.3 
2 ,. Ke:nmerar .,. E~ A. tt Th-$ ABC. of the Federa.1. Reserve- Sy~ tem u 





Ever.r National ban w:aac raqtU.:re:d.. to join the Reserv-e. 
bank o·t 1 ts dist:riut;: othe.r bsnlta may: Joitl by m:aet1ng al.n-
imum re.quiremen;&.s... Tlle: subseribed o:apita.l of' ea.~ Federal 
'-' 
Reserve bank 1.s to be nut less than fi+.,.OOO,.OOO,!', Ea..eh m.~m~ 
~ ,. 
bero bank must 'S\lbaer:ibe to .it$ stoek in s.n BJJtOunt- o;f' 6~ o~ 
,· 
1.t.a paj.:d,.;..in ctlapita:l and ·,surplus.., one ha.lt ia to b$ pai:d in 
within a ye~r and the rest 1'& payab~e on call,. 
Each Federal Reserve bal:l.k ia to b~ governed by a board 
o'1! direetors of' nin'el mem.bera.. Tl::tre~<e:. known a:a '* cla,ss A dir-
ectors: are to bl$ ohaaen by,. :and be .:repreaenta:ti.ve of the 
Dl$mber banks;~ the three ttclasa iEl di:ree:toratt ahall ba <!UlSaged 
a.ot.:tvely 1n &omm.eree .or .asric~1aral. puJ;sl:llt1 and not .assoc-
iat·ed with any bank .. , ~bree ''class :0 di.re,et,or:af.l shall be &p~ 
poin:ted by the 9ede.ral, Be:s.arve Board": t;wo. o.:f who ::I. m~et ha va 
tested banking ,e:x;pe;rienoe... One or tnes.e ie to; be ~ 
ot the Board of' DirEH:~to~_s and l?.$deral Baae)?ve Asent, ... J. 
the general wpe:ryisory body -o-f the banking system was 
the F~dera.l Rese!"Ve Bo&:rdc. There ~e a-&ven me-iniber-s; :f'1ve 
appointed by the President,· -and ·.tb.e Secretary of the !:re-s.~,-,. 
ury, :and the Comptroller of the Currency~ Th:e Act :reqtd.rea 
the .P:ri'esid:ent to 11b:ave due regard t-o a. ts.ir reprssEJnt4Uon 
ot t.h$ f.ina.neial., a.grio:ultural., and aommeTG1al inte.ra.sts, 
and Geogaphical d.i.via1ons o:X the 9ountrY-~ '~~~2 Tent -r:>i# o:f'fiee 
l,_. Fe4eral. Re:sarv~ A~t, :eeet.ion 2 as published in Willis.~ 
·~-lha Fede~ Rese-rve SysteJai:l P., 1667 
2 ,.- Ibid;~ :se-ction lO 
• 
• 
member .may be a.aaocia.t.ed with any ba.nk1lli; .1Jo.st~tutl.on 
during his term ot fxfti.oe~ Its ,general. power'& ar~ many~. 
:and ar~ supp¢rted by statut,oey po:w-are.,.. It lntarprete the. 
provo:ts.1:one o:f the. law and :ovel?sees ~ir- -obsel"V'ttlt'lle-.. It 
:rev.iews the r.~.:tes o-t d1.aeount of' the Raserv·e banks and 
.snperv1aes the open~a.rk-et. operations .o:f ~ ayatam..~ :rt. 
is author1:z$d 'to B'tfapend. ::t"e~terve requirement.s,. and ~aaa1~y 
' .. ,. 
. ' 
the ~~r~~ ae$1grutt..1.on. O·f e1.t;ies. It pa~aes upon t;~.PP~i.~ 
·cat!otta t'or- ~r-sh1p,: ~nd ·has many .-o-ther .f'Unet:i'®n;s,. · 
~ ot' 1ts duti6s e.nd raapons;tbili"tie.a we:re o:fl1y de'Ve.lop~ 
ed as the Sy.atem was :formrua.ted and ~ew~1 
; 
Each B'eda.ra..l Res.erv'$ distri¢'t i.s t'Q hav-e a mem-ber on ~ 
t~ Federal Mv1aory :Counci~t $tell to be. ohos'Ein. by t~ 
boards of d.:t.reo-tora ot ·the v-a.rious di.strictca,.. ~ p-urpose 
o:t the Ouunc1-:l i:S to- :con:ter and advise th-e BOard on ge~ 
bank~ng a.ct.1vl.t:y"' The 'eff:ect i.a t,o att.a.in a llaiaon wb.ieh 
:t:a..011.1ta.tes :re~a.Uone among the Board~, the Bea~r-ve Banke,. 
and the 1iler!lber'e ,,.. 2 
1 ~- l'f11.1ia ~ u llieory aDd Pl?acti.ee .. "'.,. 11 · P.. &o 




!be individual RE!l:aarve banks recaiv~ and bo~.d .:ttrom 
member ba;nka depoai t:a or. lawful. ~1:oney ( heasury notes) ;: 
.a;nd batlk note~, .. lt"ederal Reserve nO"tes, and cheCk$ and: 
·dra:t.ts dra:w:n fiS&inat. ot:tte.r mem'ber~e... The Seqretal'y of' the 
~sury may use the Reserve banks a.s de-p'oai tariEu~1 and. 
-when r-aquestedt the baJ'Jk:a act as t1eca.J. age~ta ot t.h!Et 
U:nit.ed Stat.ee~~ 
11$· Reserve balik'a 11if1.Y discount .for mermber.e;; :noiiea,': 
dra-:tts;~ a.nd hUla o·f' eltehall,g.e,. Co.!Ml:er--cia.l.. pa.~r must •. be 
liquid,. ma:tu:Ping in :ninety da,ya. Oil:" l-ess,. The one e.xcept.ion 
is paper drawn T~r agr1cu1.tural pm:-poae:s, whicif mtay h&v-a- a 
maturity o:f ai1t months.... Va.rious aa.i'egua.~s and l1m;1ta were 
a.f.f'ected by the Aet and the Board'~? but t,.ba be:c&me the apon-> 
eor .of 'llli broad market :for· eom;nercia4 ja.pet-;- .and made pos-
sible wide use ot ac-e~:ptance-.s.t ·long used 1n Europe ... 2 
Section 14 of the A.et. concerns ope:n~rket .Oper-. 
'& tlons o:r i;he ae~erve bank$ an(1 ~'U tno.rize:& the pu:reha.sa am· 
~le of ~1.l Cl"'ad.1 t instruments previously J:Utd.e~ el.:ig1ble foJ:" 
tbe d1a count, :Qy membetra. Al~~ thel' may :deal. 1.n gold bUlllian 
a-otn,- a.nd c.ert.i!.ieatee, subjep;t. to the autho:rity or t~ 
Boait"d... Tlle <;}bie.f re.a&on for· peJ;'tn.itt:1ng o.pe:n··-ma:r•k.et Q:p6li".,.. 
~ti.ol'J.$ en the pa.rt ¢'£' t.hs individual. lteaerv~ banats was. . t.o 
p;eGvi~ t..hem w1rh :a method. ot ,emploYi17lS !'Q~ i'und:s :pi>ct''-'t.,-, 
aJbly..- in tl~s or <r:t'edit -.eaae,. ia:t'(Z;F"' with g;co\.itth ~ expel"...,... 
J;.,~ Fede:ra.J.. R~:s.e1i'v:$ Aat. $e:Gtiot'l'S 13 and 15 
2;];;. Ba tioll!l_ ~'0;¥ t~r-~~~;"~ ptib1iea.t1on~ 11 The Di~Gcount 
' ~ystem in·EUrd.pe11 ·aB'·~~blishsd in We.rburg.t, The 
Federal Reserve .... H 
• 
ment of credit -c.ontrol.~- !this was ba!"dly .f'orse$n but. today ie 
1 
.a ebief' weapon or <rr'ed..it policy ... 
The- prPviaio:ns for the 1e.aue of' Fede.ra1 Beserv'e notes 
sought to answer the ~ed fo~ :an u.e:tm..s:tic cur:rene_y .. n ibe 
·note-a are QbligatiollB of' the United &tates and were to be 
redeemable on deiM.Dd at any Reserte ba.nk in go1.d or I.aw;tul 
mon-ay:a-- Tbe pl."''CGS.s of' ia£U:S w.aa .as .:follcwse: 
/! J'o:tea of' au..f'fic.lent. v.olum~ a~ h-eld by the Jrsderal 
Reserve Agent-.. Upo.n requi&.i tion th~.Y are .1.sa:tfed by the Agent 
in return tor- eollat.aral in the f'ull amount of' the oote.a 
.issued. ru.s collateral may eo.n&i:st of (1) gold .and gold 
.certi!'i'ctii;tes; (2} 'c o~erci.a.l paper,. aligible for- .r&di-seount;. 
and {3) papar meeured by obligat.ions <>t' the UnitfB-d :S.ta.t.a.e go:vern-
ment*' At least 40~ of this col.lat.eral ~u.at be e,old or gol.d 
eertif'ica.tea~ a-o the .m.iniif1llm ~e:curi. ty behind tne not.ea ia 
49% in gold' and 60~ in pape.r·.., 
When tne paper held by tba Agent matur4!Ja, 1 t ia s~ 
rendered only in exchane,e f'or more paper., gal.d-, or 
F~dera.l .EtEt!ie:rve no t;es ... Tb.i·s. insures quiek. r?'tirement and 
el.a.st.;tci ty co;r>rt!H!pondl.ng t<J the currency n-eed.s o-:f" tbe publie,., 
Section. 1.6 a..l:so provides :for the · eleara.no·e a.a.d col--
lection or checks by the P~ae:rv·e bann .... This service became 
1.'• 1\'ie Federal Res.erve System,. 
• 
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providing. quick and a:rt1cient t.ran-s:f'er dif funds. 
m1 t ted. at tl:e plea.sura of' tbe parent bank and . ths 
Federal Reserve Bo~s ..... Earnings· o:f tbe Reserve banka were to 
be disposed .flret in a. 6~dividend to the illeml::.er banks on 
the Stock ilelod by th$m,. The remainder o.f the net earnlnes 
were to be divided be'twe~n th• United State$ anE. the surplus 
J. 
of tbe Bank. 
The ~ti.rement of the United States bonds e~euring 
cirouilttion wa.$ ~f'fected by the. $alta ot tbeee to tM Reserve 
Ba.nk.a1 who then were perm1tt;f!!Jd to take out circula.tien equal 
2 
to their par value~ 
Fol"' the purpo.se o.f' statu tory .resar ve requ1.l"'el1Bnta.,, 
t.he me;:nbars were ·d1v1dad into -central. r.ee~rve cities" reserve 
ci t1ea 1 and thoaa rema.1n1ng 1 )~'country ba.nks .. ,n Reeerv.as were 
gradually to be transferred to the Reserve ba.t'lke> a.nc. mini-
mum. balances bad to be ntet. after ttll'ee yea;t"'$,.,.- Fjjl"' eantral. 
reserve city hanks 1 12% !nti:st be held behind dema.nd dep.os1 ta 
and 5% behind ti:ns depoal t.s . ., .Reserve c 1 ty bs.nke ~uat. hol.d 15~ 
rE&aerv-e behind E!e11and d&poaltii and 5% on time depoa1ts .• , For 
·country banks: the requ1r.ceme-n:tg were 18.% bebl.n.d daaand d.-e<po:ai.ta 
3 
and 5% behind time depoai ts ~-
Each :.aem,'be.r bank l1U&t ~ exaa1n$d twice yea.l:"ly by th• 
Colttpt.roller o£ tbs purrancy "*'. Fedart!l · Heaer11-e banks Jluat be 
l., Feder-al. R~sex:-v.e Act ~~n 1.6 
2 ~ !bed,. Sa ctlon 1 




e.xa~uined once yearly by the ·Fede!'e.l Beeer'l1e :C.oard • 
;re.nbers were s.llowed to estab11ah :f'oreign branches 
with t1:e per:niet<1on or the Board~. 
Farm land loans were perm.1tted with certain rest~1c"t­
l 
ions as to period e-nd a.ggreg.a te a:uount..e so loa.ne<:L, 
long., The ns.tura o.f' tl.e aubje-et required tr..s.t much be decided 
in the procees ot its a.dm1n1at:rat1on. Th~L Cone:~ess had. done 
1 ts work ~fell" if bele.tedly "' 
:elodi:t'lca. tion and cJ:mnge would be deoa.ted af'ter the· 
esta.b11shm.a.nt of the .e:yste::n". just as they .t.ad. been debated 
an the course of 1 ta birth ... But 'the all-importa.nt g,oal o:f 
thirty year 1 s work on the part of' acholars"' then bank-ers, 
then etat~e:nen :tad been attained.., Central baaki.ng r~ been 
fortnally e&tabllar,.ed~ 
The grow1nB nsed, even urgency of central banking 
bad met popular acceptance and finally, political a.cceptanc.e, 
2 
tboush not by so sreat a measure~ 
The provisions of th~ aet aa su~ar1zed were designed 
to meet three s.:peclflc requlre..aenta wbicb I will consider 1n 
tt~ following tt~ea CLaptere~ 
The :.a.ost. discu.eeed and zaost .f'am111ar f'a.11ure o.f' the 
N&.tional Banking Syetem was ita so-called:. »inelastiaity*t, o'£ 
currency ~nd also or credit,._ 
l:. Federal. Reserve Ac-t. Eactio:.n 2.5 
2,., C&rter Glass~ rt-An Adv~nture in Constructi~e Finance~ 
Doubleday 1927 
•• 
'!'he next e~apt&r consider·& how tr..e new ba.~ing law 
provided a. flexible currency and :nnre important~ credit to 
meet· tee needs of an e.xpaadins economy., 
• 
•• 
Prior to 1914, the currency had .conaiete4 mostl.3 of" 
Treasury notes eeeured by gold and allver.., and or He.t1onal 
ba.nk notes which, a~curad by speeit'ic i'unds of govern~ent 
obligations;, were liml.ted in. amount by the .siz-e and nature 
of' tt~e nationa.l debt. 
»A.s a .co:nse.qusnof!J, additio.na~ paper mol'l8y could not 
ba a.uppl1ed gasily wh&n business $0 requi..!'ed, and curNn-cy 
would ccimlll&nd a premiunr a:a.d beeom.e hard to eet."' currency 
.shortages, togetl'l$.!" with rela. ted dav•lOPJTiEmta { conaidered 
l 
later)"' caused several fitllii.nci&.l pan.ics ... u 
lt'~re.fore a. l.$adlag task or the new systa11 wa.e to 
provide a currene1 to expand 1n volu~e with tr"e need;e of' tbe 
economy. 
Ela..a t1clty implies two condition$; 1lu.:aed1ate ex--
pansion whenevar demand.for cu.rJ?en:ey ari£ea,. an:s prompt 
2 
~etire:11s.nt when the nesd ba-s passed., 
'ihe old .N&t1onal. Bank not.as were .signally inelastic..,. 
Tile tdUi.Vaila.b1l1ty or currency in tim-e& o.f' ps.nie was t'a;n111ar 
to all and 1 t w&& £Uppoeed that issues :Oi' not.,ee. was the re!lled;r,~ 
Uthough thls view ignored oth-ar .a:speets of th9 probl.em, the 
need f'or· notes e:erve.d as the ini tia.l. ea..use !"or banking ~ef'ornt • 
nua.aticl ty!ll '00-C&Jle tt~e ,~:rtarttne point on t.t.e road to refor-m: •. 
1. 'ilia b"ederal Reserve Sy$t~m,. uThe Feder&l Reserve. Sy3tem, 
Ita l?urposea and Ft;.nctions• 194·0 P .. 62 




Firat; note-Issue could not be expanded to meet sudden 
da-:fl:aod .. , Note-iat:uc \'laS baaed upon g_over:o.;nent. bonds. C1reulat1.on 
is thero.fo:re liJUlted by tl'-e e~.cpply ot ava1labJ.e bonds having 
the cir<:ul.a. tlon pri vlle£61 t:rs ms.xh'lt ... ua o:f notes is thus re-
st:r1eted by the total supply or bond£L •. "Wbe:n our n&t1.onal d-ebt. 
began to be reo:uced~ t.ha l1mlted supply of bonds v!th the 
c1r.culat1on privilege ge.ve t!.:E.::u a value far a.'~Jove their ln-
l: 
vestment price'"'» 
A furtr...er h1ndX'a.nce wae based on the mot! ve tor iaeui.ng 
notes .• 'Ihla vas not. the need.n of buslneec but the poe,a1h111ty 
of profit fo-r tt;e bank". 1b:te concerns :.uany ott.er consider-
.a.t.iona .. , The price of bonds, or th:e (.;Urrent rate of' interest 
tnay pnclude profit fr~Ul note .1'sev.e-~ Here. the bank will pref'er 
to make a loan by creating a deposit account. 
fi.JDtperience :has shown u~at a. ayatem o:r notes 
secured by bonds is inconsistent with the 
automatic adjuat!li.ent of' the quantity or tr..e 
e1reulation to t~e d~aade o~ the pub11e and 
the needs of trade'"' When the de.:n&.tld lor loans 
is great and the market rate o,:r interest ia 
high, there is l1t.tle ;>ro1"1t in 1$aul:ne_ notes; 
in abort, when the dsttta.nd may be urgent,. tJ:~e 
aupzYlY may not be f"ort..hco;nlne. ... ""2 
Contraction was raore delayed tLan expaaslon,.. To wi t:t..-
draw 1ts c1rculatl.on~ a bank must d~poeit lawful money wltb 
the Treasury and receive tr,e bonds eecurlnt. the note~ ul.ti-
rnate reda:11.pt1on* In tl,nes. of' urgeat de~nand for notes, which 
was ueua.lly only te~11porary, 1 t would be yeara be .fore the 
:notes were l:f'ithdrawn;!' and tee ba.nkle abi~ity to is.su& note:e 
~ ... J ,., L .. Laughlin, tt.Ba..nk1ng Progreea 11 2., 24 
2-• Ibed. p,., 30 
•• 
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was substantially reduced tor many months; 
Seasonal variations in need have been pronounced in the 
tJni ted Sta. tee due to the prominence of ag,ricul ture,~ The de-. 
mand. for currency and deposit credit is greatest in the c:rop;.o 
moving season, the autumn of the year .• This yearly expansion 
explains the occurrence of panics in the late summer and tall-.. 
The question of currency elasticity was, in reality,, 
part of a larger pro'bllfm.t the organization of credit itaelf.-
!n time of panic, tta. hard pressed businessman wanted a loan, 
and 1! granted, he found a pertectly el&.stio medium o:f exchange 
l 
in deposit currency.,. 1t The resort to clearing·....,house oertif1-
cates wa.s cr•edit exp~.nsion 1 not currency expansion. 
The understanding of this proole!n required a. long. educa-
tion, but the matte::.r o:r elastic bank..,.notes was overeha.d.owed 
gradually by the need for ela.stic credit, which wa.a provided 
in part in securing notes by com·mercial assets under the 
Federal .Reserve Act.jc (Chapter V) 
Tbe Federal Reserve System. achieves elasticity ot 
currenc.y by i te issue o.f Federal Re.serve notes~ Tb.ey are ia~med. 
op.ly in receipt 'iff collateral equal at least to the amount o~ 
~ ..... 
notes applied tor~-· Their supply can quickly be expanded •. A:ny 
m.elD.ber banks deeir1fi6, currency to meet business needs may 
rediscount eligible c<:Hnlll.ercial paper a. t 1 ts Federal Reserve 
1.. La.ughlln, J. 1.., n 'l'ha Federal aeeerve Act. ~ •• ' 1 
Appendix D P. 378 
............ ________________________ __ 
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bank and take the proceede in Federal Reserve notes. This 
proceae me,y continue as long ae tbe e;vld reserve of the 
Federal Reserve bank is 40%· or more (now 25%) ~ 
Further, to meet extreme emergencies tr..a Board ie 
authori:r.ed. to suspend reserve requirements of the Act,.. 
Contraction of circulation 1e affected ea.sily a.s 
surplus notes are depo.e1 ted by the publlc in banks.. 'The 
'banks in turn deposit theEJe notae to the credit of their 
turned to the Reserve bank ot origin where the collateral 
behind their iacue is l:"edeemed~ 
ttlt is ma.:ni:!eet that when the paper upon 
the discount ot which, Fad.$:t:'al Reserve notes 
were leeu(ilid, matures and is pe.id., th& 
Federal Reeerv·e bank lltust deposit. gold or 
substitute other eligible paper in place o:f' 
that which has .natured~ul 
Si11ce neither the public nor the banks hold any more 
idle cash than tr~y need, all n~tes not needed find their 
way prom,ptly back to the Reset~ve ba.I!k.. Thia 1n$uree a 
perfectly Qla.s.tic currency which will automatically expand 
and contract a& conditions require. 
1'he power to issue notes had been the chief point of 
controversy up to J.,684, and 1 t wa.$ st111 the chief concern 
of the re:f'or.mers or the late aineteenth century. The 
n:aalti.:nore PlanH of the Americt:\n. :&!.nlters Association in 
1694 concerned itself ent.irel.y with the proble;n o.f note,... 
l. F. B. ... Ea.nk of R1cmnond, nQuestion and Anewar on the F'" R. SyEtell 
Second edition, 1926 
• 
iseues of banks, disree::ard.ints tr~e role of d.epoei t cur·rency 
1 
entirely. 
Gradually 1 t \·ras perce1 vca. tbe. t more h1porta.nt and 
underlyin£ 'tl;ts m.a.tter .of currency elasticity, wa~ the flexl·-
ble wovkine. of c:r·.ed1 t ~ 
uT'na banks, th:r•oue,h their credit o.per-
a.tiona., ca.rr·iad on by cr..eeks drawn on 
depos.1 ts! we:t:•e oxercieing a currency 
function ~ar and away more extensive and 
important than any -perfortn49d. by paper 
money .. 't2 
1-b.la. r0al1zat1on wa.s very gradus.l~ '!he praviou.e 
century in ba-nking theory had been concerned ~;1 tl".l. U'1e is£ue 
o:f notee,. by wbo'n find to wha.t extent~ 
By 1900, 95,% ot a.l1. business was transacted by credit 
dev1cea. ~rob&bly lese than 5% was ea.rried out by u~e ot 
a..c tua.l money or bar;Lk, nota .a ., Credit media are per:re ctly 
elastic; they expand and. contract exactly as t.be volume of 
co:n;ne:rce wb.ich bringe them into axis t.ence ,., 
In a panic) such as. 1.893~ or 190?,. a bua.lnessm.an doea 
l'lOt necessarily require bank notes to meet hie obligatione .. 
If' a ba.nk. will lend t1lm deposit credit for hle a.aaet.e, in 
effect~ translate them into Enea.ns o.t' paymea.t; he is sa.f'e. 
r.o.erefore; the "crux of the whole matter :ts traceable to 
3 
the banks. Can tt.&ey expand loana sut:fioiently?n Is deposit 
credit elastic? So~ ele.eticity o!' note.,...,ieeue, which ia 
1. Willis, 11 T.he Federal Reserve Syate1nu 
2*- Laughlin n.Banking J?rogresan, ?. 26 




desirable to help ease panic preesure,. is not the whole need. 
f.o:ne measure had to ba provided to incrE::ase the lend.....-
in& power of the nnket. by enlare;inE t'belr reserves of trana-
±'orming tbeir' aeeets into forina of motley 'itich r11a.y be "USed as 
1 
lawful rer:erves 1 upon wblch cr-edit :"Uay be expanded. 
lJ.lie Federal Reserve S;rstell eoue:ht to provide for this 
a1e.aticity o:r cred1t in several ways~ 'lhe orte;1na.l r•ese:r·va 
require·nenta of the Natioa&.l Bankin& Eyr:.ten ru::~re rsplaced by 
::nore flexible provisions. . '.Ihe r$servee of all '!Jere pooled 
and made availabla to e.ll j.n the FE:deral Hee"erve bank. 'lbia 
made for rnore efficient use of funds and money previously held 
oterile in "reeerven could be paid out into the :ttoney etre&ili. 
It bas been fllstim.ated tha.t almost one third of all 
bank reserves previour:ly held inact1 ve i'~ere freed. by the 
F"ederal Reserve Act .. 
An i1npo:rtant meane to $nle.rge bank reserve~ &ad tt:..ereby 
provide credit elasticity and expa.no1on, was tba crcatlonor a 
market :for commerelal priper. Yunde from thls source eer·ved o.a 
legal reserves and euppox·ted. tru.e elasticity, t;·.~e expansiOi'). of 
credlt ln need+ 
So the c;.uestion of ''elasticity relates closely to the 




V. CO:-J.,:-1ERCL~L PAPER I•~D REDI~CO'V'NT 
One of the chiof retM.:ons for tbe cetu.bl.l.sL'lent. of 
central bankins t·ras t0 !)!'•::>vida e. m.et:tns for rediscount of 
opm~nt of sll other co:n!;.lc·:r•eial phe;noilene. in tho United 0tates 
had been rapid t t.'tere wse 11. ttle progrcce . .in 'the form o:f' our 
comm{;rcial paper. 
In Europe, ·there were £Cores of ba.nlu.> and prl.vo.te 
private banking fir;ne t>thlch made a· busines:z of e.nclorsine; 
I t: 
com'n.ercio.l bill.a and €.ClV€ tbree m.<:n1tbe: 1 acceptance on com-
\o.ercial paper. .A eotn~ner·clal borrQ'I'ler in Europe can sell to 
hie bank or broker hin own threc,...1110nth bill dr~t·m on a bank .... 
1ng firm ":1111~1~.to give him credlt, or he :nay eell a b111 
'·. i 
drawn by hl.Hl o1o1 lila c': .. u:s tome.t· ( 111 paym.ent of goodE eolu to him), 
: i 
/ <... . . 
A banker' a a.cp~ptant.e can be negotiated by a b\.tyer uhan-ev~r 
.Ji . • • 
I 
he wishes tri re~li,ze on tbe bill. 
/ ·,.;· 
privately d.r b~,.:re41acollnt1ng at a central b&.r.Ji. 'l'he psr·scm,. 
! I !! ' • 
! ; 1 ' 
fir::n, ol"' ~:nk~:; wht;:) buye co:nmercia.l ;>aper can secure pe.y:,lent 
a.t ac.y ti;~t~~ ;fJ:t'h~; f,lU&lity o.:r the bill ie assc.red by the est-
a.bli&hed ~~rJ·~ ?:e' tbe acceptor~ or by the endqreeme:n.te on 
the bill,. ,;:f'fJ:he,; co:ndltions of sale depend only on the rate 
It,. -1: 
of inte:r;~eiL j 
::./! 'i.! (i. i 
~o/. ·~~iue.' crt.' the contrib~Jtion crt St.\ch a paper to the 
i : J . .f ;'' 'i·::! ' \. :: 
'stabilit1~ tfo.:nd. ~i-owth of an eeonomy can hardly be calculated~ 
. ':,: .{/ :.~ l ii:::, '· . 
1:. Nat:l,rb~\ l:icm~ta.ry Comro.iesion publication 11-I'b.e Dl.ecount 
·· fifll{s. teth i~1 ~urope «. as publ1$b.ad in \'/arb. urg 
t'~~~ 1Fed.~ral Resel"'Ve Syatem. 11 'Volume II ; ;(/ .\ / '\\· . 
. ·;'11;/i ~ ,. ,,,. 
If\ ·.-... !; ;h 
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while t:l. voldiu( thiS' absor'btiO.tl <3.fl.d 1:".:.andl1nt; of currency 1 so 
ment a.ots to clear credi te in tl,ne .• 
A bank e:ndoreed :paper Jla.Y c lrcula to the continent 
before it. tUatures" lf money tiz:htens in France, all Europe 
~I ill invee t in French billa, as the higher rate o:r interest 
will attrs.ct idle funds from ever·ywhere-. 111 this way etab--
111 ty ie eex•ved. tJi t.1:.. a well-ot"g,anized. Eys tc:A o:r blll£:< of 
cr:antF an(i mf:.n:ufo.cturar·e, is jo!ned. to 'thE: r·ecog.nized credit 
of t:te banker. 
In the United Eta teE. prior to 1913, no comptJ.:r.>able 
syetem of fa.oil1 tatlnb co.tm1e:rolal credit had developed.. A 
oomme:t•cial borrottel"' rece1 vE>d a.cco:nodation f.ro.n r:.is own bank~ 
and hta note bt;c~;ne an 1111qu1d as£ot. in tho 'bt;;nk~ s portfolio .. 
1s£".ory notBe.. i'lhe only eecuri ty '"as u·_,_e :n.G:r'cha.nt b.l:neelf and 
the not€ was u$ually held till .tautur1ty .. 
H'l:he consequence wa.e tLat while ln Europe 
tLe liquid aas~ta of the banks eoneistmd 
chie~'lY of billa r·eco1 vable~ long and shortf 
~;·bich co,net1 tute t.hei:~r" qu.lckeet a.as.ets., 
I.mqr,ioa.ti bank ca. pi tal. is in vee tad in COill-
me~oial 8-Sseta and. is virtually irn:nobilized. ttl 
our mf;;thod wae just tLe reverse of' the European where 












call money naturally goes into the h1.ghly liquid bill 
mar-ket., The ba.nlrs were forced to limit the notes they 
bought.and therefore restrict tr~a total investment in paper. 
In the United Sta.tee call money was invested. 1n the stock 
exchange~ 'l'he result is speculation stocks when trade is 
relaxed, and when the requirements of commerce increase, the 
money need. of tl:e whole country was called from tbe etock 
exchange, ca.ue1ng a. dist:nrbance there. 
So one of our greatest ha.ndica.pe was the absence o! 
tr~le ooat:no.n two--na~e ;,:>e;per to tac1li tate our comcnerce and 
take up idle funde eafely.. The use of this paper req_uired. 
central banking facllitieB where the paper could ultimat~ly 
1 
be rediccounted for ca..eh~ 
Tha Federe.l Reserve Eyatem met thia need., and the 
previously iJ..liquid pa.pe;r:· wa.s mobilized almost overnight 1 
as it became readily turned into reserves or cash at the 
Federal Reserve banks~ 'l'b.e Act p.rovlded. machinery by which 
paper could be reditl1counted tt.il:'oughout the nation, .from 
member bank to Reserve bank, and 'by one Reeerve bank for 
another~ 
Interest rates were lowered and stabilized aa rese.rv~$ 
\":ere free to flow in am1wer to deJl&nd for crsdi t anywhere in 
the country~ Di6count operat1one mounted rapidly and reached 
a peak in 1920 when -a:verage d.a.ily holdine.e or the Federal 
2 
Reserve System. amounted to 2 .• 5 billion dollars. 
1. National l'donetary Commission r~SUge;este.d Plan for Monetary Reforn: 
Senate Document 784 p .• 4 Submitted January 16;: 1911 
2. Federal Reserv$ Syatem., n~king ~tudiesn P. 257 
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In time, diecountiD.£. became the ct.ief f.nea.nc ueed by 
m.ember banlte to seC1.1re :r'EH:srves to ,neat seasonal or u.ne.x:.-
pected demand for cred.it~ rn this circumstance~ the banks 
¥muld discount an amount of :9aper w·hich would yield. an in'""" 
crea.ee in reserves eu:fficient to alloiv then to :neet legi t1-
mate l.oan reque.ste -~ Co;nmerc1al paper., therefore riE):.tf'ully 
became the meet liquid and. versa. til~ aseet in tr~e bank1 s 
portfolio., 
'lhe discounting provisione·or the E'ed.eral Reserve Act 
cr-eated a wide and liquid commercial paper market. !t sup-. 
ported tb.e e:x.teneion ot el:,ort+:-term credit to more merchants 
a.nd manu;f'acturers than had ever· been acco:nodated before.,.. 
'l'lle t:eneral beae:fit realized from tble service 1s 1nca.lculabJ.e. 
Any member bank with satie!actory collatera~, as defined 
earlier> can obtain e.ccomods.tion f'ro:.n i'te Feder·a.l Reserve 
bank. 
A policy gradually d$Veloped wher•e the Bys tem eXP'""' 
ressed encouraged or discourae,ement o! discounting, and 
therefore borrm"ling"' by the rate ct.a.rged for tr;e discount, 
The tradition arose whereby tbe Federal Reeerve System sup~ 
ported expansion when it was believed to be in the public in-
terest, by set tint; a low discount rate. 'ilhen sxpaneion waa 
be:Lieved har!Uf'l.llt the discount rate was raised. 
For rne.ny years thla device WS.ll the p.rincipal raatho(l 
of' expra.eelng pollcy with respect to the money supply., In 
recent years, due to an inflow of gold and wa.r-ti'.ne develop..,. 





have declined in .1m::)oi'tance. For many years, ho~rever, the 
discount of commercial paper wo.a the ma.jor source of Raeorve 1 
bank cred1 t, and the chief financlal .lnd.ex. of the natlon. 
l 
1~ Fed.era.l H.eeerve System, "''l'he I<~aderal f~eserve System, 
Ita Purposes and FUnctionen ?. 26 
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• The f~.quent occurenee or mo.ni!ttar;y c~iaes indieat.es 
• 
that even ano~ p:ro.:teseiona.l b&nkars there was littl• u.nder-
sta.ndlng of' the problems of' ere('Ut. and banking arlsi.ae through 
the la:at halt o:r the nineteenth century~ 
ft It na ree.J~iz:ed th& t 'the c-urrency was 
in.el.ast:ie but- it wa.s no:t well underet.tHXit 
tba.t it waa interw-ov-en with the rigidity 
o:t the :aredi t :iJy:s teYB. and the . exi.st,ing 
ma.nagement of bank :r&aerves. "l 
Fi:fty ysa.:r:-a of' the kt~onal Ea.nking S;Jst&.a bad tl.tU'-turad 
a f'eu<ial d$pend .. ene.e or eounwy ( C'!9X"nt:Spondent} banks on larger 
city bank:a tor advice ~nd d.iaeouat.s in t.ilaea .of t.r:ouble,.. 
Country b&nk:s had ;found it conven.tent and necessary to carry 
balances in city banks to provide :funds :for their ~erchant 
custtbmere,"' The cla8ai.:1f1cat1on o:f ·os.nka Iror reserve purposes 
waa in:fl.uenced by this :sy$tel!i o~ p:r·ovlding do!lleatic ext.:hanee. 
Tbe tbeory of adopting thi:m corr-espondent relation t'or tl':.$ 
.reserve sche.:ue in the lfa.tiona1 Banking System preeu&ea that 
theee bal.ancea :ao hal.d were equi v&l.ent to eash.. .l.n added 
a;ttraot-ion :tor- country bank-s was the interest pa.ld. on these 
2 
bal.ancee .. 
l,. Laugr.W.in, tt·rne Federal Reserve Syatemtt P .. 146 
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develooed a com.petion amo-JiJE banks for dapae1 ts of banker • s 
~ 1 
balancea.~ !hie. eom.petition for funds resulted in fluctu-
ating interest rates &rid jeopardized the whola fimmei&l 
s.tructure gen~r&lly,.. In the_ 1900-r·e.,. there wa& a constant 
t.sndency to .i.afla.te the s-tock market aad. r&itte prices sene:r,.._ 
a.ll.y; tt..ereby increas.ine t'te strain on tt.e b&nke .. 
It was not g.-enerally realized ttat in time o.f euch 
strain., the old reserve· s;yi'St..em manifested a s1tua.tion of" 
un1.1quid f'unda.,. 
ttln e. panl.e tt.e ~nds invaat.ed (by ban.k.$) 
in call loans could not b$ realized upon&. 
and tb.a. t situation 1ncreaa.ad the t.etld&!ley 
t.b; keep more ea.&h a.t home 1. t·o lock up · · 
lawfUl. ;'llOMJ o-n. a. sign o:f tr:oubl.e(and aa 
happened in the panic ot 1907) 'to· proauee 
sueb a sca.re1t.y ot money in a.etua.l .e.ir.cu-
lation as to stop ordinary payments by 
banks,. n 2 
The syate!a of reserves in 1913 :N:quired the banks in 
tlle tt..ree- central reserve c1t1ea to hold 25.% o:r their deposits 
as lawful money in tbe1r own vaults.... ihoae 1n the 47 nreserve 
citlesn were to hOld a.. 25~ reeerves.;J oi' which 12l!' could be 
left witl: central reserve city banks. Tbe country bankswere 
required to bold a 15% reeerva of whicb 9% could be held 
with reaerve e1ty banks,. 
l~ National :>Ionetary Com;Jtia'!!lon,. Sprague_, 0 ... Jt. 
nH1.atory of Cr-isea under the w .. B .. s~, ?. 15 




H1stori.cally., re:eerve requirem-ents wsre i:raposed by 
law for tl:e purpose of protecting deposito-rs, by aseur1ng 
ttat banks did not lead to e. point where they could not 
~eet th&ir depoait.ors withdrawals.. Gradually, 1t was realized 
tb.at tr"e scr~:n.e or reae.rve was not prct.ecting. depositors 
despite their blgt. ratios, and t't..a.t '*reeervea whleb a bank 
was requ1r·ed to maintain were not reserves wb.1ch 1.t could 
1 
pay outlf., 
Lending wa.& atined whenever th& m.l.o.i.aun legal reserve 
was reached, be-cause t:ten the Comptroller could close up a. 
bank u:nable to replsnieL its reeerv.es .. 
This reser,e liYSt$\lt waa unworkable and the reform 
a.t'f'ected by the Federal Re:servs Act wsr.e long overdue: •. 
The .Act as origlna.lly paaced pro-vided !'or the gradu&.l. 
withdrawal of' lee;al-reafU've monay held by correspondents ... 
.By 1917~ eacb ;llember bilu1k was required to t.a.ve its entire 
l.ega.l .reserve in 1 ts Federal Rai!erve bank* 1h8 three year 
period was f'el t necee:s6.rty to .make the er..aJlBe a. a easy a·s 
possible., 





{2) To render bank reservee actually liquid by re-
quiring taat it be a single entety,, apart fr0011 the banks 
1 
the;aael ves ..,,,. ... __ .,...., _ ,.,... --
by aseuriDg genuine and -~:Ja.f'e rea.erve.s actually &vail.a.bl.e ln 
need,., The divorce of legal-r-eserv-e :tunde !rom th$ :!tonk 
;na.rket w.ae u·an outJ:tandin6 a.ch1eve:aent. of tbe- Federal Reserve 
2 
E.ystem.,» T.b.e concentration o:r reserves ln thie way made 
ths:n available for their or101nal purpose; 1neu.r-a.nce of tl:e 
ab111 tj o:r ~ bdnk t-o taeet 1 ts obllgatlone.. The total amount 
required for tt~e purpo~e wae lowered by one third under tte 
Federal Reserve Act 11 , rele&fl.in.e previouely 2 ter1le funds into 
the :f'l~w of cQm:aerce ... 
!he Federal Reserve ACt introduced anothe-r and pre-
sently mor-e i!!Lporta.nt a.speet o:f bank res-erves • Th1:s 1s tile 
relat.ion or b&ak reeerves and lendl.n£ power., 
When the F-ederal. Reee:rve- tysteJn was eetab1.1sh.ed,, tl:ie 
lending power of reserve banks v.ae thought to re.ae.:nble tt;;e 
landing power of city corree_yondent bankS,.,, In tl:-e course o.f 
ti:11e it grew apparent tr .. e two are distinctly d1f.ferent-
Extene1o.o.s of Reaerve .Eank credit, issues or- cleari.ng-
bouee certiflc&tea~: depoait& or Treaaury·f4.nds, and deposita 
1 ... Willie, uThe .Federal Reaerve~o~, E~ 145 




of' gold all re.eemble each other in tt.:e essential rae te that 
t:h.ey orlelna.te re-eerve funda not previously ex1st1ne a:.1d 
t·te.rel'or augment. the a.t,g_regt\te volume o:r reeerves.~ 
ln t'te panic of 1907, tl:.a New York banks attempted 
to attain reeervee 1.n three ways: 
(l) 'lhe importation or gold; 
(2) '!he depoel t o:f law.f'Ul money b:; U.:.e Treasury;: 
l 
{3.) 1he 1aeue of cle.!Wlng-bouae cartiticates ... 
In t!:.e effort to pr&veat the panic of' 1907"' 
f'rozn apre&d.1ng, these· three aa.t.ter~ were domina..ting, be-
e&u.sa they touch$d. dlre~t.ly upon the POW€·:rt. or the ~ 
t.o l~nd.. There wa.a -c~1a1e not because of' a s.ca.rci.ty. ot 
eu.rrenoy 1' but beca.uae the la.rgestc ba.nka had had exoeesi Vit 
dam&nds :nade upon them and bfi1c:a.ua.a they held. investmeDt.s 
which had be-come rel.a.t1vel.T UllSO:thnd'l. or illil\Uid... 
The bank a in 1901 had no reeour:se to d.1s eount. even 
their best paper.. 'rile e.r.lsis was e.gg.ra.va;ted b.J the- timid., 
people and ba.nlts, wbo draw down cakb reserves and :further " 
reduce tbe reserves available to bank.m,:upon wlliph they may 
expand crad1 t, neces.sary to arrest the panic 1·tsalf' . .,. In 
eueh .a a1t.uat1on the bank.s. :a.ra called upon to C~J£t:ry mer;,o.,. 
allanta doing a. legitima t.e business w-ho are in "t.rouble..., 




b&llka to lend.. Fo;:r?-tuntii.tely, in 1907-,:· t.he banks ware Wry 
sucoes.$tu~~ they used the1r .rea.e:rve& to buy and borrow 
over $100.,000,000 in goid from Euro:pe. Lilta sold l.mporta,. 
l'reasw;-y d~pos1ts in New York also h&lped to ine:r&ae.e bank 
res-erves.., The landing pow~ o:r the ba.nka was In.ereaa$d. 
tour to :a1x thtte'$ c.o.r~.$ponding t.o the :reserves :t'e.t.ios 
then in ef'raet. '"the o.:o;e central t.hl.ng to ~ dons was 
to 1ncraa.ee res-er'Veti!t:._ Sera w.aa the e~ o;f the mat:t.er.,tti 
Rea:e:rv:e .requ.l.re.raent.a under the !fe.tional. .Bs.nk:1ng Sy-
stem &t'fected a restraint upon the .f'r:eedos o:t banka t.o.1end 
when reserves were a.t tba legal m.i:tll.m.'lmt.,. Oonv-$rse~:;r ... 
J.ending .:night be- reaum:ed. when :reserves were .repl.en1shed,.,,2 
:Re·cogni tion o'!' th.E:lse .taete gave be.nk re-serve.a a new :sig-
ni.f"1canca.; instead iC:f being regarded a.$ the individual banks 
guaranty of' readines-s to meoet .:its obli&ttione, they ba"le 
oome to oo the m;ean:s by which c~ntral ba.nlti.ng aut.:hori tiea 
ma.y eurta.11 or 1.nc:t'$ase a.bailabl.:e bsJak nl"'e.di t,., 
W.o.en the Federal. Rea.erv-e Act wa.e passed,, the cev.-ol...,.., 
ving nature or reserves wac& underst-ood by :few.. In tAle p,o_p-
ul.ar m:1nd,,. 1fu.e Reaer"'ie banks well'S apoo.lingu and "mobil.izins" 
reser'V·ea... This was co:rreetr~ byt the f'uJ.J. e~tent. ot' Reserv~ 
ba.n1t le.titung power ·and Res-erve bank credit was not rea.ll~ed ... 
In e~tendin.s credit by diacou:rxt1ng pa.pe;r or purehe.sing s:ec-
l,. Laughlin,.. » Tha Feden.l Reae.rve ., ..... ,., * .P... 381 
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ur~ti:es, the 'ba.llks. do n-ot uae :fUnds already lleld in depo·sit ... 
'lhe.il" lelJ.d.ing power i:s inde~ndetrt o! ·funds s.lr~y h$ld . ., 
ifl'len they extedn e~1t t.hey inex-a:a.ae both their assets and 
liabili ti·e~, a.nd they a.etu_a.I.l;y o.rigi.na.t..e th$ t'rulds th$y lend~ 
·Gradually* a n-ew aoneept or ~aerv,e baillt e~d1 t arose 
· ,, to. rmpplem.ant gold and uwtul mo'.tLey as .a aourQe o;t ~ 
re.Hrve.s.., !he lending power o:r elty c-orrrss.pond.ent ~s b&d. 
m~I'ely ut.1lhed :funds al.X'eady existing and ~by .r"&duc.ed 
the volume o-f' bank rese;rvea a.vai:L&bJ.e :for et:'e:dit extension~ 
In co:n't.lfe.:E$t .. r the l-ending <J;f a ~~erv-EJ bank -&Dl.a.rges 
the a.,~ga. ta: o:f all banlr r'$-a$rvea:;, upon whl·eh thtt mul. tipl.e 




A.Jterias.n bankitiS ·e:x:perlenoe Trom 1837 ,. when the op-
eration of the Se-cond Ba.nk o:f the United States was con-
;eluded, to 1.913,. when the Feder.a1 Rese.rve .System. wa..s est-
ablish€Jd"-. affords many illustrations o:r the need. :for a. cen-
tral banki :og orga.niz;a t1on,. 
In the .a.b.senee ot :to.rma.l. central. banking, certain 
neoessax'y .f'Unctions were carried on 'by other means.., ~e cor,.., 
respondent r.ela.tio.nsb..ip, the clearing house, I!!Jld the Il:l.dep-
ende:n:t ft>easury were all used to carry out central. ba:o.k.i.ng 
!'unctions~ It is ne<>esaa.ry.to cons.ider the development of' 
thea.e substitutes to :fully '-nder.stand the evolutlon of een-
-..:~ .. 
~~' 
tra.l banking and the variations pre-sented as compared w1 th 
standard pract.i~ .. , 
Another necessary eonaid.eration ia past financla.l. 
experience and 1.e.gislat..1on. It 18 the t'oree.s of' the past 
which shape present problems.._ 
The auece:se of thEJ F.ii'st and Second. Ba.nk.s o:f the 
United. States was a r.esult. of' good banking praotice,. !he 
poJ.icy of" note redemption~ n.ecess.s..ry as .it weu:J 1. ired pr1va.t,a 
ba.trke:rs ., Pra:a.i.dent Jackson was persua.d..ed against the ad...-
~ ~, 
m1n1s'trat1on o:r the Second Bank and it was d:tsoontinued,.. . .-·-"·• 
ttWildc.at banking" wae the result, whieb inan.gu.r-
.. 
s..ted a. Western prejud.i.ee- against Ea.atel"U ba.tikers .ln general 




This prejudi.ee was to lingel:" and in!'luanee. the political. 
::nanuvering durills the pae;s.ag$ o:t' the Federal .Reae:rve A.et,. 
Th~ Natlo.nal ~king ·sp:tern provided a sa:f'e and 
uniform. -cur.reney :for tbe :f1r:iit't time e:1.nea 1836.~ · A sa.te .· 
tUl.d un+.torm. crurreney wu no:t enoug:b in the la.t.e n1net.~eli­
th cen.tury as ®pr-esaiP.ll$ :followed upon prosperity in 
quick $Uecesa:1on~ Th$ economy ll8.s. outgowing th& bank-' 
ing ·syet·em and v£uty rapidly ... -:. 
:By the t.'ll'n. o.f' the cantu.ry it. had become obviou~ 
that reform wai:l neees;fl).ary,. .t'wo lBng ana aev.En'~ dapres-
:siona had prompted ·e.ch!;i1.a..r-.s to cri ti,aize t:he .system ofaa. 
bond~b4Ured. curl;"an~y as $S.l'11 as 1880.- '!'he currency wa.s 
termed ~in$1-ast:ie:" and could not meet the !!:J.Ver,yl:iay needs 
et commerce tor· eash pa$Jien.tajf Thi.a e.ritl:e.1.am. \1ia.a. univar,... 
eall.;r :r-ecogni:Ze.d.;- out. not ttni ver·sa.l.ly und~.rat.o.od in a.ll. 
·1ts im.pl:.1.cationa. 
El&a-t1a.1 ty o! credit:, 'th~ ab111 ty trf banks to .ex.-
pa.n.d loans. on $ll 1-egit.illl&'t.a. (10.lJ..at~ra.l was a more lmport.a.nt. 
aoroll.ary o.t re:t-o)?.tll,., The m.edia. of' ored1:t, if'' auitab.J.y· ava.i1.-, 
able>. is pe:r:t'~ctly e.la.stl:q,_, ~ expands in proportion to. 
In &.~i,e 1.1ket tM.t -of' 1a9-3:~: a rne:r,cbant wants ~ , 
'loan ·on ~a &1lUl\e\J.~ whether paid· 1n n.otes or a deposit- eredi t . ., 
If" he ca.n get eith.el'1 he ia :aa.!e"i' Be.ra 1.:$ the be.art- o:f the 
Jta.tter,... Can thfa 'b$.nks eJl;pa.:nd cr@d1.t. suf':ficiently fro, anable 
• 
all legitimate borl'owers 'to get a.ccomoda.tion and avoid 
bankruptcy? ra there elasticity of' credit 1 
The. .National .Banking Syatam could: not make this 
possible"" The l.aw required all banks to maintain :rued 
reserves and ta this,,. many $,uspend-ed specie payments 1n 
times ot criai:s,.. Loa.n:s to. ha.t>d.pr'e&s.ed merchants were 
impossible., A seJ:"Utb-le :ror ~serves W8.$ 1mn1table as 
.each bank tried t.o· pr-o:teet 1tsel:f.. Credit was paral.yzede' 
Reserves wh1ab had. t,o be held a.eainat deposits oould not, 
be paid out,., This W&·fi the ~1.mple, though obscure truth ... 
In retrospeetj: the problem eentar&d on. how to 
make rea.erves" or lending pow.er,., avallable to banks to 
a.J.low them to $eet 'S-easonal. and extraordinary dem.a.nd :for 
arEtdi t.,. The .real problem wa-'s not :f'Ully under-stood~ even 
., 
'\ T.he Federal Reserve A~t. sought to pooJ. t.he ma.ny 
thousand ind.i vidual i'reservea m., and thereby .fl!;aka mere e:f-
f1c1ent use of them.. To a ~,ert.a1n :extant, this aim was 
correct.,.. But the lendlDS powe-r o:f .a Res.erve bank was not. 
to be the same as th~ l$nd1.ng power of .c:mrreapotldent banks. 
It. beca.m.e appar.ent that the two are 9S$:entially umu1ke . , 
nEx:tena1ona o-:r Raser~.e bank erad1 t,. 
1a·su.ea o:t elaa.ring-hO\lae. oe.rti:fieates.,, 
tra:n:a!ere of' currency f'rom the Trea..sury";:s 
va.:u.l t:s,,. and depo si t.a Q;f gol-d all re.aemb~e 
.each other in the essential f:act ._hat they 
originate r.aserva :funds not previously 
existing.. and t.hel"'et'ore .augment the aggrega:te 
volume of ~nk reserves_, upon which 
the mul tipl·e. expansion o:f bank ~redi. t 
is baaed . ., Lending by a oi ty bank to 
its country correspondent,. on the 
other hand.;;c merely ut.l.l.izes :fUnd!! a:t-
ready ·e.x.i:stillg,.. lt reduee:a tl:ie agg.reg-
ate vo~wne o:f bank reserves available 
ror erad~t extension~ whi~e ~ending 
by a Reserva. bank :enlarges that 
. fj L 
aggregate... J . 
~8. 
This change .1n the nature or Reserve bank el:"ed;.:.t 
!tlakee Reserve b.anks more si.gnigicant as sources or funds.,. 
tr...an as re1lervo1rs, a.a t:hey were t.hought to be,. •serves 
then~. were tho'U€)'lt of on.ly as an individual btulk trans--
action..: GrMual~y,,. it beca.~ reali~ed that Reserve bank 
credit granted to a bank is not retained by it, but trans..-
.fel"l:'ed througho]lt the banking syatmm"' Sinee reeerve:a .~ 
only a :fraction of' depos1 ta,, :an:y increaa~:s itt the volume ar 
reserves as a whole., serves as .$. basis f"or expa.ns1.on o.f 
" bank credit several times as gr:aat. .. · 
These faeta ware not .f'~lly .real.1Z$d save by a 
f:eY aeholars.1 even 1n.l9I~... 'lhe:r.$f'ora, the :runet.iona and 
pow$.rS conferred upon the adminiatratora or t~ F$deral 
Reserve system.., in an att.emp't to. s.ec~ ba.nldng retorm,. 
~re greater than realized~ 
Even today, :it ~a ·dl.t't'ic\llt to aay that !.n 1913, 
one ~f the three c.ompanent.s. o:t reform. was more importa-nt 
than another-.~ Today the di-eH.~:ount. of Qtommerc..ial. paper l:Jaa, 
dee:u.ned markedly in importance... The: probl~ll. o'f a n~ible 
currency is solved,.; In contrast'~; the role or bank .raa.arve:s 
11' no m:o~ illtportattt in 1913,. is certainly the leadi~ 
Qone.ideration in ·eentr&l b~ng theocy today. Bank r~a­
$rves "are;J 1:10w l:"ege.rded mAinly -a.s the individual means by 
whieh th$ eent.ral ba.nking a.u.tho,ri t.iee may .e1 ther curts..ll 
or augment;)- a..a publia 1nter$at d1.reote:1. the a.bili"ty of" banks 
to extend cred1 t ~ 1l 
Re.s.e:r'Ve.s batl'fe become the focal point or effort-s 
toward better or o·pt-l . .m:um can.tral banking policy., When the 
banking syat-ent i.s t'unet1oni:c.g :sa as. to be able to .extend. 
crsd1 t -whenever ana t.o w'ha. teve-r wxtent the public: interest 
d1.reet:&-;· teen the long--sougb:t goal. of the pla.nne.rs -of' the 




.. '!!ht:t 'ba.<Cikground t.o the Federal R-es.e.rve Aat J.l.;ea 
grea. t-ly in .ea.rlr Am.er i ea.n ba-nking exper1e.nc:e; in the 
Firat and Second Banks of the Ulli ted States 1 tree banking, 
and the Independ..en:t Trea.aury Syatem,.. 
'!he growing need ~or a general 'P$.nk:1:ng mea.aure 
wae met by t.he kt1onal Banking· Aet .1n 1863s promp'ted by 
the f'isea.l nee.ds ot tb.e C1 vil War .. 
I 
Tne new system met the needa of the economy f'~ir~ 
.. . 
ly well at f.i.rst)' out lagged bal:tind tlle expaning ecooomy 
a.s the C-Elntury wo-re on.., The f'irat evi(l:.ence o:f this wa.s 
the Panic of 1873. The banks. could .m:r"t support ~ e.zpa_n ..... 
sl.on, ei t.her with fUnds .QI" depoal. t n.r~di~... Bank reserves 
were attracted to the :Stock market .in~liew York> where- they 
served to prom-ot-e pr.icle in:f'la:tion;., general expa:nsio.n~, and 
prosperity of' a eort~ But reserve ra.ti.oa a'(}ted as a l.easb. 
which jerked up the whole economy .sJ.:te.rp.ly when the maximum 
expansion of credit had been made ... 
The dis¢tfSsion or banking reform began in earnest 
a.ft:er the .pa.n.1rd ·and depres.sion o:f' 1893.. It centered about 
the m~:)'at obvious d&.teet, uinel.aert.io.ityn, or the inability 
of banks to·· prov1d.e su.:f':f"ic1ant o:urraney .• 
A:r::er the panic of 1.907, the National !ktn&ta.F"Y 0:om-. 
mission w.a...a areated. by Congres:e to st-udy the: wbol:e problem 
) •. 
-~ 
of' bat:lking t<e:tor»L. It roeQ;aQJmen::ded. the eatablisblnent ot a. 
crantral ba.nlting. i:w:rti'tu.ti.on*, After f'.i;~e years o-r d.i&-
cussion and dsb~n&,.~. the i'ed.er.IU Be.serv·e· At~t. ·'W&.S passed :tn 
It was a gener~J. re;t"orat meaa.ur~., but sou.ght :spec-
i!ical:ty three im.media±.Et.PUJ:'P.Os$s_;. 
(l} tba provi~l.on. o:f a so--:oalled el..a.$t1.o. e1.1.irency, 
(.2) tJ:te provia.iQtt of .a· scheme or bank rese~v-ea 
to promote stability and e:xpanaiGn1, 
(3} t1tha creation of a general discount market .for 
eoaerc1al :P&,pt~rr,. ·!'! 
Elas.tlcl:ty &Jld cred.it wel,":e ach1ttv.&d by t~ issue 
ot' Federal Reserve ,Mot,e_e,.. ~ey were 1uued in reeeipt or 
at least lOO$ value,, and were ba-~ked by at leas-t 40% gpld 
and. 60% eomm~reta.l paper.,.. 1his provided au.f'f'.ie.1e:nt curr-en.-
ay ·eXpaneion and .a. liquid t:eaerv.e behind it .. 
Reserves and ·credit .expanaion w:erec provided to.r by 
pooling th~ reserv-es of' all member banlts." a..nd latel? by the 
dav.a.lopment and -extens.1on or reserve 'bank o.redit.., 
The :concept ,ot reser'Va_s unde.rwent: a gradual. cba.nge ~ 
Frev1oual.y_,, ·they had existed to a..aeu~ · anQ. prQteet the notE!f'-· 
hol.dera and d&,P-O$itors of' a. bank .. , Und~~ the Federal Byatr&m 
they bee.ante important ¢h.1ei'ly ltt rel.a~i.on to 'tlleir- lend.i:tlg 
power"" Lend~ by a. r:aa.erve bank·i.ncreaa:es 'ba.:nk. res.e:rv-e.a 




Bank ~aervea t.here:f'ore became the sottrca and 
meaau.re of: ·crgdi t expa.naion .• 
Coaim~rciaJ.. paper and· red.1aeount were aom.meoo~l. 
•· 
banking pheno111~13a <lomllon in Europe;L · No, eo.mpa:rable •$}-
etem of commercial el"adit had d.gveloped 1n the Unl.t.e;~ 
. ' 8tate.s~ :The ~btfensa o:t •t.wo~e~pex- and the non1x.1st-
- _;:- • ,.. :.:~· • .r>{', . ..,,_ •. . • '. 
ence of' eentral bariking .!f:S..oll..it..ies eom:pe;tl:ed the banlte 
. t.o inve-st th$l.r fume ~:Ullqu1.d. seourities o:t;> lo~ on 
trhe ato~ exoh~e. ... 
file i'eder~l :ae.s.-aMe Act. met. tld:e l'leEH\ by· p:rov.td'"" 
_.blg ma.rutinary to .flls,count tor: ca.:ah .a.ll. .e~~rc:tal paper 
· meeting the nominal 1\equi.t"em.en:ta o:r the Aot .. , nte.se op~.r-
/i .. 
. a.tiona boomed to a pe.ak o·f' fZ .. ,5 1::>1.l.l10lll,s in a'V$1:'lage dai1.J 
hol.d:t.ngs or the Federal Re:aerve Sys'tem in 192'0~. 
52.· 
In ret:ros;p.ect:"'· 't.h$- rerse~v-e co.ncept. and th$ ds.va1-· 
opment o~ Federal Rese~ve bank credit co:mpri.s.~ the key to 
the :rsform o:t" J.9J3,. 
Control ot b.a:nk r:e:s~rv:e:s baa beo:ome the means 
whereby the :eantr.al batlltl-ng a'Utlll-ori ties occur tail or a.ugmen:t ;· 
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